This paper integrates Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization (DPSO) and Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) to propose a DPSO-SQP method for solving unit commitment problems ancillary services. Through analysis of services, including Automatic Generation Control (AGC), Real Spinning Reserve (RSR), Supplemental (SR), the cost model was developed. With requirements energy balance, operating cons...

Abstract- In a typical competitive electricity market, a large number of short-term and long-term contracts are set on basis of energy price by an Independent System Operator (ISO). Under such circumstances, accurate electricity price forecasting can play a significant role in improving the more reasonable bidding strategies adopted by the electricity market participants. So, they cannot only r...

The issue of market concentration in electricity markets and resulting possible anti-competitive behavior of producers is a much discussed topic in many countries. We investigate the day-ahead market for electricity at the EPEX, the largest central European market for electricity. To analyze whether generating companies use their market power to influence prices, we use a conjectural variations...

Bidding competition is one of the main transaction approaches in a deregulated electricity market. Locational marginal prices (LMPs) resulting from bidding competition and system operation conditions indicate electricity values at a node or in an area. The LMP reveals important information for market participants in developing their bidding strategies. Moreover, LMP is also a vital indicator fo...

In many power markets around the world the energy generation decisions result from two-sided auctions in which producing and consuming agents submit their price-quantity bids. The determination of optimal bids in power markets is a complicated task that has to be undertaken every day. In the present work, we propose an optimization model for a price-taker hydropower producer in Nord Pool that t...

This paper analyzes the question whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, in ...

This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, ...