In this paper we study the problem of market equilibrium. Firstly we consider the model (Fischer model) where there is a supply of money associated with each buyer and a quantity associated with each item. The market equilibrium problem is to compute a price vector which ensures market clearing, i.e. the demand of a good equals its supply, and subject to his endowment, each buyer maximizes his ...

Since the Cournot-Nash and Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie contributions to equilibrium theory with complete information, two main advances in equilibrium theory with differential information appeared. The first one is by Harsanyi (1967), who introduces differential information into the Cournot-Nash model, and the second one is by Radner (1968), who introduces differential information into the Arrow-Debr...

We introduce agent-based dynamics in a class of Arrow-Debreu economies with capital accumulation and technological progress. In this framework we confirm results obtained by [Gintis 2006] and [Gintis 2007] in an exchange economy: the micro-behavior of boundedly rational agents can lead to the emergence of equilibrium at the macro-level provided some form of collective optimization takes place v...

We show an auction-based algorithm to compute market equilibrium prices in a production model, where consumers purchase items under separable nonlinear utility concave functions which satisfy W.G.S(Weak Gross Substitutes); producers produce items with multiple linear production constraints. Our algorithm differs from previous approaches in that the prices are allowed to both increase and decrea...

It is proved that, under a nontriviality assumption, an additive function on a Cartesian product of connected topological spaces is continuous, whenever the preference relation, represented by this function, is continuous. The result is used to generalize a theorem of Debreu (( 1960). Mathematical methods in the social sciences (pp. 1626). Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press) on additive representat...

In a class of games including some Cournot and Bertrand games, a sequence of plays converges to the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the sequence is “consistent with adaptive learning” according to the new definition we propose. In the Arrow-Debreu model with gross substitutes, a sequence of prices converges to the competitive equilibrium if and only if the sequence is consistent with ada...

En el presente artículo se explica que puede entender la enseñanza de microeconomía en dos componentes: desde los agentes y su toma decisiones hasta equilibrio general primer teorema del bienestar; y, límites mercado competitivo las diversas fallas mercado. Se argumenta es necesario añadir una tercera etapa a microeconomía, basada fundamentalmente Mantel-Debreu-Sonnenschein sus consecuencias. e...

A pure exchange economy with a financial market is studied where aggregate dividends aremodeled as a diffusion. The dynamics of the diffusion are allowed to depend on factors which are unobservable to the agents and have to be estimated. With perfect information, the asset market would be incomplete because there are more factors than traded assets. Imperfect information reduces the number of o...

In the companion paper [2], Balasko and Shell establish existence of competitive equilibrium for a pure-distribution, overlapping-generations economy without money (see, especially, Propositions (3.10) and (3.11) in Section 3). That argument is remarkably simple, but depends critically on some strong hypotheses concerning individual tastes and endowments. In particular, it is assumed that, in a...