A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing dividends are the Shapley value (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally am...

If the subject of dividend distribution is limited to what dividends actually represent, there should be no room for uncertainty in conversation. However, dividends, which are defined as a portion company's profit that belongs each shareholder at end financial year, relation shares held by him, can raise new questions many different respects. Not only they about when requested or who belong cas...

The determination of stock prices and equilibrium expected rates of return in a general equilibrium setting is still imperfectly understood. In particular, as Grossman and Shiller (1981) and others have argued, stock returns appear to be too volatile given the smooth process for dividends and consumption growth. Mehra and Prescott (1985) claim that this smoothness in consumption and dividend gr...

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corre...

We examine the interaction between capital structure and dividend initiation. Reasons often given for the positive abnormal return when firms initiate dividends are the signaling of asymmetric information and the reductions of agency costs. Theory also suggests that these are reasons for choosing debt in the capital structure. This study finds that the effect of initiating dividends is dampened...