We investigate the problem of revenue optimal mechanism design [Myerson, 1981] under the context of the partial rationality model, where buyers randomize between two modes: rational and irrational. When a buyer is irrational (can be thought of as lazy), he acts according to certain fixed strategies, such as bidding his true valuation. The seller cannot observe the buyer’s valuation, or his rati...

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of...

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers, each of whom wishes to buy at most one item, and m sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. The traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms for trading are considered. The buyer’s bid double auction collects bids and offers from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a marke...

Despite the popularity among millions of users around the globe of selling, bidding, and buying products using C2C online auction websites, the existing literature on online auctions provides us with little understanding on important factors of the C2C auctioneer website performance. One way to understand the performance factors of C2C auction websites could be to extend the past theories of en...

For an important family of asymmetric auctions, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher in the sealed high-bid auction than in the open auction. This is true for any arbitrary numbers of weak and strong buyers. The family has linear equilibrium bidding strategies, and provides a fertile ground for research in asymmetric auctions. We establish many interesting properties of the line...

The increment of number of services provided in World Wide Web lately drives more and more consumers to ecommerce. During the last years and due to the vast increase of estores (B2C), electronic marketplaces and electronic auction sites became more popular. Many researchers examined how buyers interact with the auction facts and sellers during the procedure. Questions such as “how do millions o...

Human cheating has been a barrier to establishing trust among e-commerce users, throughout the last two decades. In particular, in online auctions, since all the transactions occur among anonymous users, trust is difficult to establish and maintain. Shill bidding happens when bidders bid exclusively to inflate (in forward auctions) or deflate (in reverse auctions) prices in online auctions. At ...

Shill bidding is the act of using bids in an online auction to drive up the final price for the seller, thereby defrauding legitimate bidders. While ‘shilling’ is recognized as a problem and shill bidding is strictly forbidden in online auctions, presently there is little to no established means of defense against shills. This paper presents a software bidding agent that follows a shill bidding...

Coexistence of identity-specific and financial externalities among bidders is a salient feature of auctions with buyers who are cross shareholders or competing firms in an oligopoly. This paper unifies these two types of externalities in revenue-maximizing auction design. Our main findings are the following. First, these two types of externalities can be unified through the framework of Myerson...

In a multi-attribute combinatorial double auction (MACDA), sellers and buyers’ preferences over multiple synergetic goods are best satisfied. In recent studies in MACDA, it is typically assumed that bidders must know the desired combination (and quantity) of items and the bundle price. They do not address a package combination which is the most desirable to a bidder. This study presents a new p...