We combine insights from economics and psychology to understand how firms strategically plan to extend and terminate their contractual relationships. In many economic respects, provisions that allow a buyer to terminate a project early and those that allow a buyer to extend a project have much in common. Psychologically, however, including and exercising extendibility and early termination prov...

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contracting institutions? In an anonymous exchange environment traders can sign a contract, hence agreeing to interact with the assigned partner, or wait till the next match. Any contract can be endorsed (for a pay) by the enforcement agency, which then observes the interaction with a positive probability known to the traders and punishes t...

In recent years African countries have faced a barrage of policy advice backed with financial support from development partners urging them to implement ‘good governance’ reforms. Good governance has come to mean support for improving the enforcement of property rights, the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving accountability. These reforms have enjoyed broad support because many of th...

* Corresponding editors: [email protected] at CLRC and [email protected] at QMUL Abstract In this paper we sketch a framework supporting contract enactment within the context of virtual organisation units that are dynamically created in order to achieve a common objective by securely sharing resources, services and information. The framework is built on top of a joint exten...

This study examines how managers’ use of expectation management is affected by labor market mobility, measured with the enforceability of non-compete provisions in employment contracts. We find that managers in states with stricter non-compete enforcement are more likely to manage analyst expectations downward, consistent with labor market immobility exacerbating managers’ incentives to ensure ...

Institutions and Contract Enforcement We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat ...

the kind of contracts of government and public organisations that relates public affaires, that named public or administrative contracts , are very important to fulfil legal duties of government, and public contracts are new forms of providing public welfare, and management of public services, that are based on consenting instead of being authoritarian, but had been studied less in iran law bec...

The paper analyzes the development of law enforcement regarding ability certain contractual structures to change legal regime marital property. Prior introduction a mandatory notarial form an agreement on property division (Federal Law No. 391-FZ December 29, 2015 «On Amendments Certain Legislative Acts Russian Federation») and clarification in paragraph 1 Article 256 Civil Code Federation type...

The institution and enforcement of property rights contracts have been an important policy issue for the developing countries, transition economies, developed countries in 1990s. This has led to development a literature on technology transfer how might affect such transfers host-country welfare. Much this is non-strategic, with large numbers northern' innovative firms southern' imitators, focus...

Abstract The article analyses the role of smart contracts in architecture European Union’s Data Act proposal. It identifies five difficulties: lack flexibility terms both content and operation; dependence on oracles which could lead to errors; vulnerability bugs changes architecture; immutability privacy; problems enforcement. then offers some recommendations about how address them improve Act.