We analyze how private learning in a class of games with common stochastic payoffs affects the form of equilibria, and how properties such as player welfare and the extent of strategic miscoordination relate across monotone and non-monotone equilibria. Researchers typically focus on monotone equilibria. We provide conditions under which non-monotone equilibria also exist, where players attempt ...

This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm a...

Does consideration of sunspot equilibria in the cash-in-advance model help the model match key features in the US macroeconomic data? One can use the cash-in-advance model to generate predictions of macro time series via an equilibrium of the model. However, when restricted to minimum state variable stationary rational expectations equilibria, the model’s predictions do not match the data well....

† We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. 2 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other tha...

In this paper, we characterize all interior and boundary equilibria of the GrovesLedyard mechanism for a large class of economies and demonstrate their stability or lack thereof. We prove that the mechanism implements large numbers of inefficient and stable boundary equilibria, one for each of the efficient, asymmetric, interior equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (BST). We show tha...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy ε−equilibria for all ε > 0. We show by examples that there are: 1. quasiconcave, payoff secure games without pure strategy ε−equilibria for small enough ε > 0 (and hence, without pure strategy Nash...