In our work we adopted the decision-theoretic principle of expected utility ma~mieation as a paradigm for designing autonomous rational agents operating in multi-agent environments. Our approach diifers from techniques based on game theory; we are not looking for equilibria, and we do not have to assume that the agents have arrived at the state of common knowledge. Instead, we endow an agent wi...

When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a particular action, if this punctually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a different plan if the agent’s payoff significantly diminishes due to ...

In this paper, we analyze negotiations of investment shares in interorganizational supply chains. To formulate the research issue more precisely, we develop a taxonomy of enterprise networks in general. We propose an investment sharing model that makes use of Shapley values as indicators of relative negotiation power in a network. It turns out that a focal buyer (supplier) in a supply chain can...

Abstract. We present a game-theoretic model for the line planning problem in public transportation, in which each line acts as player and aims to minimize a cost function which is related to the traffic along its edges. We analyze the model and in particular show that a potential function exists. Based on this result, we present a method for calculating equilibria and present first numerical re...

Cognitive radio is a promising approach to make efficient use of spectrum by rapidly adapting the changes in wireless environment. In such networks, nodes are expected to be aware of their environment and must be able to learn from the outcomes of past decisions. Game theory which comprise of analytical tools designed to study interactive decision-making processes can be applied effectively to ...

Ensuring user entitlements in computing systems with scarce and commonly preferred resources requires time sharing. We allocate resources using a novel token mechanism that supports gametheoretic desiderata such as sharing incentives and strategy-proofness. Œe mechanism frames the allocation problem as a repeated game. In each round of the game, users report their demands for resources and spen...

Communication networks shared by sellsh users are considered and modeled as nonco-operative repeated games. Each user is interested only in optimizing its own performance by controlling the routing of its load. We investigate the existence of a Nash equilibrium point (NEP) that achieves the system-wide optimum cost. The existence of a subgame-perfect NEP that not only achieves the system-wide o...

The general approach for the pricing of rainbow (or colored) options with fixed transaction costs is developed from the game theoretic point of view. The evolution of the underlying common stocks is considered in discrete time. The main result consists in the explicit calculation of the hedge price for a variety of the rainbow options including option delivering the best of J risky assets and c...

As information systems become ever more complex and the interdependence of these systems increases, a mission-critical system should have the fightthrough ability to sustain damage yet survive with mission assurance in cyberspace. To satisfy this requirement, in this paper we propose a game theoretic approach to binary voting with a weighted majority to aggregate observations among replicated n...

To bridge the gap between domain experts and formal methods experts, visualisations of the behaviour of formal models are used to let the domain expert understand and experiment with the formal model. In this paper we provide a definition of visualisations, founded in game-theory, which regards visualisations as transition systems synchronised with formal models. We show example visualisations,...