Drawing upon signaling theory and the attention-based view of the firm, we study if signal receivers attend differently to different types of signals when they interact with different firms or operate under different market conditions. Our theorizing and empirical analysis is situated in the context of the follow-on fundraising activities by private equity managers managing a first fund. Using ...

We evaluate the performance of fixed income mutual funds using stochastic discount factors motivated by continuous-time term structure models. Time-aggregation of these models for discrete returns generates new empirical "factors," and these factors contribute significant explanatory power to the models. We provide a conditional performance evaluation for US fixed income mutual funds, condition...

Measures for evaluating the performance of a mutual fund or other managed portfolio are interpreted as the difference between the average return of the fund and that of an appropriate benchmark portfolio. Traditional measures use a fixed benchmark to match the average risk of the fund. Conditional performance measures use a dynamic strategy as the benchmark, matching the fund’s risk dynamics. T...

We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund’s absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager’s participation constraint. We find that the impact of ...