Financial crises in countries are often accompanied by an out‡ow of foreign portfolio investment and an in‡ow of foreign direct investment (FDI). We provide an agency-theoretic framework that explains this phenomenon. During crises, agency problems a¤ecting domestic …rms are exacerbated, and, in turn, external …nancing constrained. Direct ownership can circumvent these problems, but during cris...

Article history: Received 21 August 2013 Accepted 15 November 2013 Available online 19 December 2013 Capital adequacy plays an important role in determining banking activities. A bank must hold a minimum level of capital to ensure sufficient funds to buffer against unexpected losses or adverse shocks. This study analyzes and compares Islamic and conventional banks in 14 Organization of Islamic ...

This paper investigates the effects of bank internationalization on risk-taking. We find that internationalization increases bank risk-taking: the Z-score of US banks that engage in foreign activities is lower than that of their purely domestic peers. The results are consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis, whereby internationalization increases banks’ risk due to ...

We highlight the ex ante risk-shifting incentives faced by a bank’s shareholders/managers when CoCos (contingent convertible capital) are part of the capital structure. The risk shifting incentive arises from the wealth transfers that the shareholders will receive upon the CoCo’s conversion under CoCo designs widely used in practice. Specifically we show that for principal writedown and nondilu...

We analyze the risk implications of European bank consolidation on the probability of default of acquiring banks. Using the Merton distance to default model, we show that the average bank merger is risk neutral. We examine the extent to which merger motives linked to risk diversification and regulatory incentives explain the observed risk effects of M&A. However, we find only limited evidence c...

External finance is critical for less established entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection can hinder competition. We model how lobbying for weaker investor protection reduces access to finance and decreases competition in countries where politicians are less accountable to voters. Weaker accountability thus produces a smaller economic elite. As empirical support for this result, in a broad p...

This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium. The paper compares different traditional regulatory policies which intend to fix t...

This paper explores liquidity risk in a system of interconnected financial institutions when these institutions are subject to regulatory solvency constraints and mark their assets to market. When the market’s demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, sales by distressed institutions depress the market prices of such assets. Marking to market of the asset book can induce a furt...

We study the effect of sovereign credit rating downgrades on firm investment and financial policy. We identify causal effects by exploiting the effect of sovereign downgrades on corporate ratings that is due to sovereign ceiling policies followed by rating agencies. We find that sovereign downgrades lead to greater decreases in investment and leverage of firms that are at the sovereign rating b...

This study investigates the profit efficiency (PROFEFF) of small banks (those under $500 million in total assets) for 1990–96. Assuming that small banks and large banks use the same production technology, we find, consistent with Berger and Mester [J. Bank. Finance 21 (1997) 875], that small banks are more profit efficient than large banks. Small banks in non-metropolitan statistical areas (non...