Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. This paper discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components...

Smart contract-enabled blockchains allow building decentralized applications in which mutually-distrusted parties can work together. Recently, oracle services emerged to provide these with real-world data feeds. Unfortunately, capabilities have been used for malicious purposes under what is called criminal smart contracts. A few works explored this dark side and showed a variety of such attacks...

Extending the notion of contractual pricing introduced by Makowski and Ostroy (2003) to economies with moral hazard, this paper develops a model of team formation and organized competition with three main contributions. Firstly, a team’s organization is defined as an allocation of (public or private) commodities together with incentive compatible actions and information to its members. Secondly...

This paper studies a queuing model where two customer classes compete for a given resource and each customer is dynamically quoted a menu of price and leadtime pairs upon arrival. Customers select their preferred pairs from the menu and the server is obligated to meet the quoted leadtime. Customers have convex– concave delay costs. The firm does not have information on a given customer’s type, ...

This paper explores the criterion validity of stated preference methods through experimental referenda that capture key characteristics of a stated preference survey for a proposed environmental program. In particular, we investigate whether advisory referenda, where participant votes have either known or unknown weight in the policy decision, can elicit values comparable to that of a standard,...