in this paper, monopolistic behavior of opec, as the largest and most stable international organization between jan. 1973 to sep. 2008, is studied. for this purpose, fundamentals of game theory is used as a basis to come-up with a criterion to make a distinction between two market structures based on mutual dependency of institutions. then using such criterion, a regressive model based on expla...

In 2001, S. Müller and A. Zunger Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 165502 2001 predicted a never-before-observed crystal structure in Ag-Pd. Recently, Curtarolo predicted the same structure to be stable in Pt-Cd and Pt-Pd S. Curtarolo et al., CALPHAD: Comput. Coupling Phase Diagrams Thermochem. 29, 163 2005 . The predicted structure is unique in several ways. Though never seen in any other face-centered-cub...

In this paper, we review the literature on declining business dynamism and its implications in United States propose a unifying theory to analyze symptoms potential causes of decline. We first highlight 10 pronounced stylized facts related documented discuss some existing attempts explain them. then describe theoretical framework endogenous markups, innovation, competition that can potentially ...

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction ...

We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set. Allowing for a continuous set of delegation incentives, we prove that the delegation stage is a prisoners’dilemma, the unique s...

We show that the value of commitment in many standard games is fragile. Specifically, when the second mover faces a small cost to observe the first mover’s action, equilibrium payoffs are identical to the case where observation is infinitely costly or the first mover’s actions are completely unobservable. Applications of our result include standard Stackelberg-Cournot and differentiated product...

This paper examines the evolution of market structure in emerging markets during the 1990’s. While a significant process of bank consolidation has been taking place in these countries, reflected in a sharp decline in the number of banks, this process has not systematically been associated with increased concentration as measured by standard indices. Moreover, econometric estimates based on the ...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R6D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R6D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if eithe...

In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel’s long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading...