We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private va...

We study the design of truthful auction mechanisms for maximizing the seller’s profit. We focus on the case when the auction mechanism does not have any knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any k ∈ Z and ǫ > 0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of Ω...

Pricing is considered a relevant way to control congestion and differentiate services in communication networks. Among all pricing schemes, auctioning for bandwidth has received a lot of attention. We aim in this paper at comparing a recently designed auction scheme called multi-bid auction with the often referenced progressive second price auction. We especially focus on the case of a stochast...

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi–unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In part...

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi– unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In par...

Herding behavior is widely observed in auctions. There are rational reasons for herding but herding can also be counterproductive. We found evidence of herding behavior and sub-optimal outcome in a multi-winner auction setting. This study adds to the knowledge of herding by looking at herding in an auction setting where there is extra incentive to herd (multi-winner auction). Our findings recon...

NegotiAuction, a computer system which combines aspects of auctions and negotiations, is expected to overcome limitations in online reverse auctions and multi-attribute online reverse auctions. However, no studies have been conducted to investigate its possible adoption. This study has drawn on an extensive review of literature on theories about innovation adoption, and has proposed a conceptua...

Technological progress has led to electronic exchanges attracting a major part of transaction volume for standardized stocks. In the field of derivatives and bonds, electronic exchanges failed to prosper and so called over-the-counter (OTC) trading is predominant: possibly because multi-attribute assets are hard to trade in structured two-sided markets. The present paper aims at alleviating thi...

The success of online auctions has given buyers access to greater product diversity with potentially lower prices. It has provided sellers with access to large numbers of potential buyers and reduced transaction costs by enabling auctions to take place without regard to time or place. However it is difficult to spend more time period with system and closely monitor the auction until auction par...