abstract- iran achieved its self-sufficiency goal in wheat production a few years ago, perhaps at the expense of decreasing the production of other grains specially barley as stated by critics in the country. considering the dependency of wheat and barley markets on each other, policy preference functions were estimated separately for each market. incorporating political weights, a game theory ...

We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability o...

In this paper we study a genetic fuzzy system approach to assess suitable bidding strategies for agents in online auction environments. Assessing efficient bidding strategies allows evaluation of auction models and verification whether the mechanism design achieves its goals. Day-ahead electricity auctions are particularly explored to give an experimental instance of the approach developed in t...

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles...

-In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium (NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed st...

We study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort (bid) where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution. These differences can either cause a player to drop out, that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation, or use “all-or-nothing” strategies wi...

Increasing popularity of online auctions and the associated frauds have drawn the attention of many researchers. It is found that most of the auction sites prefer English auction to other auction mechanisms. The ease of adopting multiple fake identities over the Internet nourishes shill bidding by fraudulent sellers in English auction. In this paper we derive an equilibrium bidding strategy to ...

Nash equilibria always exist, but are widely conjectured to require time to find that is exponential in the number of strategies, even for two-player games. By contrast, a simple quasi-polynomial time algorithm, due to Lipton, Markakis and Mehta (LMM), can find approximate Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve their utility by more than by changing their strategy. The LMM algorithm ca...

A problem of the provision of a discrete public good is considered. All members in the society are homogeneous and they decide simultaneously whether to contribute to the provision. Contribution cost per person is …xed and non-refundable. Because of the free-rider problem, ine¢ ciency in the provision is inevitable, even in the most e¢ cient symmetric Nash equilibrium. However, when we add a pr...