I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling efforts. Multilateral negotiations occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for concreteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers offering potentially different amounts...

In negotiations, independent of the context in which these are being applied, the goal is reaching an agreement, and every agreement comprises a decision making result. The negotiator‘s expertise can determine the success of a project. Of great importance is the greatest possible amount of information on the negotiation, so as to secure competitive data which can sway the negotiation and identi...

Risks are inevitably and permanently present in software negotiations and they can directly influence the success or failure of negotiations. Risks should be avoided when they represent a threat and encouraged when they denote an opportunity. This work examines the influence of some negotiation elements in the area of risk and cost estimation, which are both factors that directly influence soft...

This study investigates how an international academic journal invests in an information system. Following the criticism that learning in an organisation is not conflict free the study sketches the decision making around the information system as a series of negotiations. The case shows that during these negotiations, the information system played the role of a boundary object that resulted in t...

In this paper we present our results on the exploration of the design space of a declarative framework for automated negotiation by: (1) identifying a minimal yet viable generic negotiation protocol and a declarative way of representing rules and constraints specific to negotiation mechanisms and strategies; (2) identifying the need of a set of basic concepts for describing negotiations that fo...

We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers’ goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer...

Note: This paper is preliminary work for my dissertation. In this paper I set out the framework of my argument giving hypotheses and describing independent variables and expectations for evidence which would confirm or deny my theory. I give a brief discussion of some results from one part of the quantitative section for US-Japan negotiations. In the coming months I will be adding further data ...