On a natural description of what a mundane visual experience is like for its subject—of its phenomenal character, of how it is phenomenally—such an experience is phenomenally a direct or immediate awareness of entities in the scene before the subject’s eyes. For example, according to Strawson (1979, 97), “mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [ . . . ] an immediate consciou...

In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience. Consider the possibility of spectrum inversion. It might be that the color experience J...

The paper deals with the phenomenal trust modelling. Required terms as trust, trust types, trust values and representation are mentioned. Fundamental description of phenomenal trust formation is presented as a form of impersonal trust which is complementary to interpersonal trust. Phenomenon is defined by the set of its possible exclusive values. The model describes the trust of a subject to pa...

We report three experiments in which visual or audiovisual displays depicted a surface (target) set into motion shortly after one or more events occurred. A visual motion was used as an initial event, followed directly either by the target motion or by one of three marker events: a collision sound, a blink of the target stimulus, or the blink together with the sound. The delay between the initi...

Following an initial emphasis on " cold " cognitive processes, which could be conceptualized within the computer metaphor of the information processing paradigm, social cognition researchers rediscovered " hot " cognition in the 1980's. Two decades later, their interest in the interplay of feeling and thinking is shared by researchers in decision making, cognitive psychology, and related fields...

Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially farreaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that P...