The challenge of self-optimization for orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) interference channels is that users inherently compete harmfully and simultaneous water-filling (WF) would lead to a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. To overcome this, we first introduce the role of environmental interference derivative in the WF optimization of the interactive OFDMA game and then study ...

We investigate advertising level, pricing and production decision problems in a supply chain when demand and cost disruptions occur simultaneously. The channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand depends on retail price and advertisement expenditure. We examine the case in both cooperative game and non-cooperative Stackelberg game.

Recently, there has been significant research interest in using game-theoretic approaches to allocate limited security resources to protect physical infrastructure including ports, airports, transit systems, and other critical national infrastructure as well as natural resources such as forests, tigers, fish, and so on. Indeed, the leader-follower Stackelberg game model is at the heart of many ...

There has been significant recent research interest in utilizing leaderfollower Stackelberg game in security applications. Indeed, Stackelberg games are seen at many deployed applications [6]: ARMOR at Los Angeles International Airport, IRIS for Federal Air Marshals Service, GUARDS for the Transportation Security Administration, and TRUSTS for the Los Angeles Metro Rail System [3] (under evalua...

Environmental regulators often use environmental policy to induce green investment by firms. However, if an environmental policy fails to exert a long-run effect on regulating the economic agents' behavior, it may be more reasonable to think of the firm as the leader in the game, since the investment in green technology is usually a strategic decision. In this paper, we consider a three-stage S...

We investigate a game in which there is a long-run player who has private information about how long will the game last, who must precommit to an action, and who faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. We might expect such a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader since most short-run players will eventually learn the true action. Howeve...

This report gives an overview of the linear complementarity problem, as a special case of mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints. The interior point method and two versions of Lemke’s method are reviewed, as methods for solving the linear complementarity problem. The report concludes with a description of the Stackelberg game and the bimatrix game as possible applications of math...

This paper considers advertising, collection and pricing decisions simultaneously for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer (he) and two retailers (she). A multiplicatively separable new demand function is proposed which influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known scenarios in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are ...

Many studies focus on inventory systems to analyze different real-world situations. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain that includes one warehouse and one retailer with stochastic demand and an up-to-level policy. The retailer’s lead time includes the transportation time from the warehouse to the retailer that is unknown to the retailer. On the other hand, the warehouse is unaware ...