This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model under random perturbations and identify long-run outcomes to remove prediction uncertainty inherited fro...

We incorporate strategic complementarities into a multi-agent sequential choice model with observable actions and private information. In this framework agents are concerned with learning from predecessors, signalling to successors, and coordinating their actions with those of others. Coordination problems have hitherto been studied using static coordination games which do not allow for learnin...

Effectiveness of the algorithm Minimax on the two-player turn-based card game Triple Triad. Research includes the depth of the game-tree search used by the algorithm and payoff values of each game-tree node as it directly relates to the complete or incomplete information of the game. Chris Constantinides 213-19-8361 14 December 200

We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information by re-analyzing two models of preference evolution, the Arce (2007) PrincipalAgent game and the Friedman and Singh (2009) Noisy Trust game. The techniques include extensions of replicator and gradient dynamics, and for both models they confirm local stability of the key static equilibria. That is...

In this paper, we study an incomplete information dynamical system. Then, we suggest a modification of this system and we applied it to the standard Cournot game. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability for the static and the dynamic in monopoly and duopoly cases are studied. Also, we formulate and study the multi-team dynamic Cournot game. (C) 2012 El...

Note: This is a only a draft version, so there could be flaws. If you find any errors, please do send email to [email protected]. A more thorough version would be available soon in this space. We have so far studied strategic form games with complete information. We will now study games with incomplete information, which are crucial to the theory of mechanism design. In particular, we stud...

Abstract We study a strict version of the notion equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (Econometrica 65:1283–1309, 1997) that allows for larger class incomplete information perturbations given complete game, where with high probability, players believe their payoffs are close to (but may be different from) those game. show monotone potential maximizer game is strictly robust if either or a...

We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non–cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm–Response Game). In the second one, the Defen...

A number of papers have shown that a strict Nash equilibrium action pro ̄le of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information (see, for example, Carlsson and van Damme (1993a)). We present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust...

The so called quantum game theory has recently been proclaimed as one of the new branches in the development of both quantum information theory and game theory. However, the notion of a quantum game itself has never been strictly defined, which has led to a lot of conceptual confusion among different authors. In this paper we introduce a new conceptual framework of a scenario and an implementat...