For n-person perfect information stochastic games and for n-person stochastic games with Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average "-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderreld property holds for each of the classes mentioned...

Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous real-valued payoffs, but may fail to exist even in simple games with slightly discontinuous payoffs. This article considers only games whose outcome functions are meas...

This paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a repeated setting. The focus is on situations in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alte...

Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of these games Hart (2002) sho...

Determining the complexity of perfect information trick-taking card games is a long standing open problem. This question is worth addressing not only because of the popularity of these games among human players, e.g., DOUBLE DUMMY BRIDGE, but also because of its practical importance as a building block in state-of-the-art playing engines for CONTRACT BRIDGE, SKAT, HEARTS, and SPADES. We define ...

We consider games with perfect information and deterministic transitions. A common solution concept is the concept of subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, where ε ≥ 0, which is a strategy profile such that no player can improve his payoff in any subgame by more than ε. We propose and examine a number of refinements of this concept. A major emphasis lies on existence results. Roughly speaking, the mos...

Planning in adversarial and uncertain environments can be modeled as the problem of devising strategies in stochastic perfect information games. These games are generalizations of Markov decision processes (MDPs): there are two (adversarial) players, and a source of randomness. The main practical obstacle to computing winning strategies in such games is the size of the state space. In practice ...