The interactions between attackers and network administrator are modeled as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum dynamic game with incomplete information, which considers the uncertainty and the special properties of multi-stage attacks. The model is a Fictitious Play approach along a special game tree when the attacker is the leader and the administrator is the follower. Multi-objective optimization...

The distinction between games of chance and games of skill is not well-defined at present. We introduce the concept of chanciness for non-deterministic two-player zero-sum games with sequential moves and perfect information. chanciness quantifies how strongly a game is influenced by chance events. We demonstrate that the relative influence of chance on game outcomes varies with the skill of the...

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game by rewriting each of these outcomes with either of two basic outcomes, namely that Player 1 wins or that Player 2 wins. If all ways of deriving such a win/los...

We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goal of a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAXgame) of communication distances from v to ...

The linear quadratic zero-sum dynamic game for discrete time descriptor systems is considered. A method, which involves solving a linear quadratic zero-sum dynamic game for a reduced-order discrete time state space system, is developed to nd the linear feedback saddle-point solutions of the problem. Checkable conditions, which are described in terms of two dual algebraic Riccati equations and a...

In this paper, we investigate the use of reciprocative strategy to induce cooperative behavior in non-zero-sum games. Reciprocative behavior is defined mathematically in the context of a two-person non-zero-sum game in which both the players have a common set of pure strategies. Conditions under which mutual cooperative behavior results when one of the players responds optimally to reciprocativ...

We consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Our goal is to design a utility function for a non-cooperative game such that all of its pure Nash equilibria have close to optimal global performance. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. Such a game formulation is very attractive as a basi...

We adopt a game theoretic approach for the design and analysis of distributed resource allocation algorithms in fading multiple access channels. The users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. We show that the sum-rate optimal point on the boundary of the multipleaccess channel capacity region is the unique Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding water-fil...

In this paper, we investigate the optimal Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) design strategies from a game theoretical point of view. The problem of BFT is formulated as a constant-sum game played by the BFT system (defender) and its adversary (attacker). The defender resorts to replication to ensure high reliability and availability, while the attacker injects faults to the defender with the purp...