objective: to classify different types of acute leukemia based on cooperative game theory and shapley value. materials and methods: in this study, patients data were collected from flow cytometry tests of the iran blood transfusion organization (ibto) have been used. 304 different diagnosed samples in 8 classes of acute leukemia were investigated. samples were initially in numerical format. i...

This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-dualit...

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it an O...

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathema...

In this paper a new model of multichoice games with a coalition structure is proposed, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen coalition structure. A coalitional value on the given model is defined, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Three axiomatic systems are studied. The first one is enlightened by Owen’s characterization for the Owen value and Faigle and Kern’s chara...

One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player’s marginal contribution—a central notion to the Shapley value—be defined in a variety of ways, but it is also not obvious which axiomatization should be used. Consequently, a number of authors e...

The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be “fairly” divided among players. While it has a wide range of real world applications, its use is in many cases hampered by the hardness of its computation. A number of researchers have tackled this problem by (i) focusing on ...

Marginanism and egalitarianism are two main standpoints in economics. The Shapley value has been characterized in many ways from the view of marginalism. In this paper, we characterize the Solidarity value with respect to the egalitarianism by three approaches applied to the Shapley value. We introduce a revised potential function and deduce the recursive formula of the Solidarity value. It is ...