Internet auctions have resulted in much data that may shed light on buying and selling behavior. Furthermore, they have allowed for field experiments to explore these phenomena with more control and with greater depth. Finally, they have revealed new behavioral patterns worthy of exploration. One of these behaviors is late bidding, or sniping, which occurs when people place bids close to the au...

A graph game proceeds as follows: two players move a token through to produce finite or infinite path, which determines the payoff of game. We study bidding games in each turn, an auction player moves token. Bidding were largely studied combination with variants first-price auctions called “Richman” and “poorman” bidding. taxman bidding, span spectrum between two. The is parameterized by consta...

We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. The fraction of the surplus lost rises with the number of voters and the total surplus loss diverges in the limit when the number of voters grows large. We introduce a simple bi...

We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. The fraction of the surplus lost rises with the number of voters and the total surplus loss diverges in the limit when the number of voters grows large. We introduce a simple bi...

The first scenario — identical items and unit-demand valuations — corresponds to special case in which μi(j) = 0 for all i and j ≥ 2. The second and third scenarios — which have non-identical goods but restrict to additive or unit-demand valuations, respectively — are incomparable to this one. Our goals are the usual ones — a simple ascending auction that is EPIC and in which sincere bidding le...

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a s...

Two approaches for bidding in games are presented: knowledge-based approach and simulation-based approach. A general knowledge-based decision model for bidding in games with its strategy encoded in a Bayesian network was designed. A program for playing four-player tarok was implemented incorporating a specialised instance of the decision model and a simulation module for bidding. Both approache...

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equili...

Problem statement: In a competitive electricity market with limited number of producers, Generation Companies (Gencos) is facing an oligopoly market rather than a perfect competition. Under oligopoly market environment, each Genco may increase its own profit through a favorable bidding strategy. The objective of a Genco is to maximize its profit and minimize the associated risk. In order to ach...

This paper considers bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction setting. We study highway procurement data for the state of California between December 1994 and October 1998. We consider a dynamic bidding model that takes into account the presence of intertemporal constraints such as capacity constraints. We estimate the model non-parametrically and assess the presence of dynamic constr...