The features of regulatory encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. Solutions to the problems of capture and cmption-limiting discretion, multipleindustry rather than single-industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel-inhibit the evolution of cooperation. Tripartism+mpowering public interest groups-is advanced as ...

Cooperation has long been an enigma in the life and social sciences. A possible explanation for the phenomenon is the recently developed idea of strong reciprocity in which agents altruistically reward those that cooperate and altruistically punish those that do not. The acts are altruistic in the sense that when agents punish or reward they incur a cost but receive no material benefit. Both ex...

Working together in groups may be beneficial if compared to isolated efforts. Yet this is true only if all group members contribute to the success. If not, group efforts may act detrimentally on the fitness of their members. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in public-goods games on scale-free networks that are subject to deletion of links connected to the highest-degree individuals, i...

1. Model 1 2. Correlations in the neutral case 2 2.1. Phenotypic distance 3 2.2. Pair with same strategy 4 2.3. Pair with same strategy and phenotype 4 2.4. Three point correlations 5 3. Threshold b/c ratio 6 3.1. Fitness 6 3.2. Effect of selection 7 3.3. Threshold value from correlations 8 4. Further clarifications 11 4.1. Finite populations for v = 1/2 11 4.2. Excluding self interaction 13 4....

The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group’s extinction. However...

Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. These findings resemble the high productivity in long-lasting irrigation systems based on self-governance. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group sel...

This paper reports an experiment designed to discover how the prospect of future interaction influences people’s ability to tacitly cooperate in repeated dominance solvable games. The experiment varies two treatment variables: whether the constituent game is solvable by strict or iterated dominance and whether prospective interaction is finitely or randomly terminated. Specifically, we introduc...

BACKGROUND Regarding the need for scientific development and achievement our national goals, it is clear that international cooperation has the main role in this way. Here is a report on what we have done during past almost 10 years (2001-2011) in the field of international medical research activities in Deputy Ministry for Research & Technology, Ministry of Health, Iran. Our effort was focused...

Because carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations, climate policy requires international cooperation and intergenerational altruism. A differential game using overlapping generations with intergenerational altruism shows how altruism and cooperation interact, and provides estimates of their relative importance in determining equilibrium steady state carbon levels. A...

We investigate the use of Artiicial Evolution with increasing length genotypes in Evolutionary Electronics. We demonstrate the need of using variable size genotypes in Evolutionary Electronics. After giving a brief description of our evolutionary methodology , we present a case study, consisting of the evolution of a combinational function. Finally, we make general observations about the method...