We provide a dynamic model of natural resource management where the optimal institutional structure that governs resource use changes with resource depletion. Copeland and Taylor (2009) analyze how characteristics of a natural resource determine whether its steady-state management regime is open access, communal property, or private property. We extend this and other studies of endogenous insti...

Abstract We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral describes scenario where election chair seeks to alter outcome by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates voters. Such actions have been studied literature for a lot prominent voting rules. complement those results solving several open cases Copeland $$^{\alpha }...

Bu çalışmada; Türkiye’deki 22 bankanın 2009-2018 yılları arası finansal performanslarının, bulanık çok kriterli karar verme yöntemlerinin α-kesim düzeylerine göre değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca Copeland yöntemiyle bütünleştirme işlemi yapılarak, hangi düzeyi sonucunun öne çıktığının belirlenmesi hedeflenmiştir. Uygulamada 26 adet kriter kullanılmıştır. Kullanılan kriterlerin ağırlıklar...

There are many different multi-criteria decision making methods in the literature. These methods, which enable criteria with measurement units to be examined together, allow choosing between alternatives. However, can produce results depending on data set. The aim of this study is combine obtained by applying set Copeland method. To end, a problem real was first addressed. Technical motorcycle ...

Structural Breaks in the Real Exchange Rate Adjustment Mechanism Laurence Copeland and Saeed Heravi We show that the behaviour of the real exchange rates of the UK, Germany, France and Japan has been characterised by structural breaks which changed the adjustment mechanism. In the context of a Time-Varying Smooth Transition AutoRegressive of the kind introduced by Lundbergh et al (2003), we sho...

We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party’s goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring r...

We investigate voting under the perspective of a strategic game. We take into account that the agents are members of a social network in which every group of individuals has consideration for their relatives. Agents are not fully selfish as they are reluctent to act in a way that harm their partners. The associated notion of equilibrium was introduced by Hoefer et al. [7] and called considerate...