Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation and Integration by Jos Jansen This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive deale...

We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are l subsets of R and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rig...

In this paper, we propose a characteristic function of the maxmax defensive-equilibrium representation that maps every TU-game with strategies to TU-game. This is given by two-step procedure in which each any two complementary coalitions successively selects equilibrium way maximizes its utility. We then investigate properties and present relations cores under three functions. Finally, as appli...

We study Cournot competition among firms in a networked marketplace that is centrally managed by a market maker. In particular, we study a situation in which a market maker facilitates trade between geographically separate markets via a constrained transport network. Our focus is on understanding the consequences of the design of the market maker and on providing tools for optimal design. To th...

A game merging the lot-sizing problem with a Cournot competition model is for the first time theoretically studied. Each player is a producer with her own production facility, modeled as an uncapacitated lot-sizing problem (i.e., production incurs set-up and variable costs and inventories are allowed). A Cournot competition is played in each time period (market) with each player deciding the qu...

Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation and Integration by Jos Jansen This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive deale...

We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential games. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games, and show that it is achieved by a CCE...

In this paper it is numerically proved that a heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly model presents hidden and self-excited attractors. The system has single equilibrium line of equilibria. bifurcation diagrams show the admits several attractors coexistence windows, where can be found. Intensive numerical tests have been done.

An approach initiated in 4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (i) Nash equilibria in games with at most countably many players, (ii) Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions for large, anonymous games, and (iii) Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) for continuum games. A new, central notion of mixed externality is developed for this purpose.