Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which...

Prior experiences and delusion content The Italian pilot study by Catone and colleagues (2) in this issue focuses on the relationship between stressful experiences and delusion content in adolescents with psychotic disorders. The authors hypothesize that a biographic continuity or “thematic link” can develop between the themes of previous life experiences and the content of a patient’s delusion...

Previous research has found that reduced self-reassurance and heightened verbal 'self-attacking' of a sadistic and persecutory nature are both associated with greater subclinical paranoia. Whether these processes are also linked to clinical paranoia remains unclear. To investigate this further, we asked 15 people with persecutory delusions, 15 people with depression and 19 non-psychiatric contr...

We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that ...

Delusions are bizarre and distressing beliefs that characterize certain mental illnesses. They arise without clear reasons and are remarkably persistent. Recent models of delusions, drawing on a neuroscientific understanding of learning, focus on how delusions might emerge from abnormal experience. We believe that these models can be extended to help us understand why delusions persist. We cons...