We incorporate forward?looking capital accumulation into a dynamic discrete choice model of migration. characterize the steady?state equilibrium; generalize existing exact?hat algebra techniques to investment; and linearize provide an analytical characterization economy's transition path using spectral analysis. show that labor dynamics interact shape speed adjustment toward steady state. imple...

using the quarterly data of 1990:1 to 2008:1 and in a general equilibrium approach, we investigate the long run equilibrium path of the equilibrium interest rate as well as the potential output. we implement a structural reduced form of a general equilibrium model consistent with iran’s economy and estimate the unobservable variables by employing the kalman filtering technique. a exponential ut...

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games. JEL classification: C72; C73; C78.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

We prove that, in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect information, a continuous-time best response dynamic always converges to a Nash equilibrium component. We show the robustness of convergence by an approximate best response dynamic: whatever the initial state and an allowed approximate best response dynamic, the state is close to the set of Nash equilibria most of the time. In...

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies’ current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and it converges globally to N...