How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist? This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal intentionality, and...

Conventional research programs adopt efficient cause as a metaphor for how mental events affect behavior. Such theory-constitutive metaphors usefully restrict the purview of research programs, to define the space of possibilities. However, conventional research programs have not yet offered a plausible account of how intentional contents control action, and such an account may be beyond the ran...

This paper is about a fundamental aspect of intentional action, namely the process of goal formation. Existing formal theories of agents are found essentially inadequate to account for the formation of new goals and intentions of the agent; on the other hand, the formation of new goals is often viewed as an essential feature of autonomous agents. Autonomous goal-formation is described thanks to...