We provide a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational : She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected utility (CEU). The characterization shows that this notion of rationality allows in general to rationalize more ...

This paper presents the first distributed multi-rate maxmin rate allocation protocol for multicast traffic. The protocol supports minimum rate guarantee for each receiver as a QoS parameter. The protocol is practical and it maintains a good performance-scalability trade-off. While the network is required to participate, the complexity added by the protocol is minimal.

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. These bounds are based on the convexity properties of the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the good. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.

For (S, ) a measurable space, let C1 and C2 be convex, weak∗ closed sets of probability measures on . We show that if C1 ∪ C2 satisfies the Lyapunov property, then there exists a set A ∈ such that minμ1∈C1 μ1(A)>maxμ2∈C2 μ2(A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) and to the core of a lower probability.

For a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring, the maxmin payoff is obtained as the solution of an optimization problem defined on a set of probability distributions under entropy constraints. The present paper offers a method for solving such problems for the class of 3-player 2× 2-games.

The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)’s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a general decision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM’s preferences, called ‘‘unambiguous preference’’, and show that it can be represented by a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differential characterization, and argu...

Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

We propose a class of multiple‐prior representations preferences under ambiguity, where the belief decision‐maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is outcome game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict sign DM's ambiguity attitude, we show that it provides unified framework through which characterize different degrees aversion, represent...

In this paper we prove a maxmin principle for nonlinear nonoverdamped eigenvalue problems corresponding to the characterization of Courant, Fischer and Weyl for linear eigenproblems. We apply it to locate eigenvalues of a rational spectral problem in fluid-solid interaction. Dedicated to Prof. Dr. Karel Rektorys on the occasion of his 80th birthday