In this paper we consider the emerging position in metaphysics that artifact functions characterize real kinds of artifacts. We analyze how it can circumvent an objection by David Wiggins (Sameness and substance renewed, 2001, 87) and then argue that this position, in comparison to expert judgments, amounts to an interesting fine-grained metaphysics: taking artifact functions as (part of the) e...

According to SR, Newton was more-or-less right about how objects move at ordinary speeds: that’s why his theory was successful for so long, and why it continues to be useful. But SR comes into its own when accounting for the surprising behaviour of objects moving near the speed of light (300 000 kilometres per second, or 186 000 miles per second). Despite ignoring gravity, SR in its turn is usu...

Let us stipulate at the outset that “omission” refers to any action or event that doesn’t occur. In contrast, one might use “omission” to denote exclusively intentional failures (my refraining from picking up the dry cleaning), exclusively agent-involving failures (the gardener’s failure to water the plant), or failures with an explicitly normative dimension (as in Billy not following through o...

It is a prima facie reasonable assumption that if a physical quantity is measurable, then it corresponds to a genuine physical property of the measured system. You can measure a person’s mass because human beings have such a property. You can measure the average mass of a group of people because groups of people have such a collective property. And so on. Now it would be truly surprising— mirac...

In “Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics,” Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this issue) argue that “traditional bioethics analysis” (TBA), as developed in the field of genethics, is insufficient to deal with moral and metaphysical challenges endemic to recent developments in neuroscience. They claim that “the link between the brain and the self is far more direct th...

The analysis of what truth means is one of the most important moments in Heidegger’s thought. It plays an important role in understanding Heidegger’s rethinking of the philosophical tradition, and (as the terms are often synonymous for him) the history of metaphysics or the history of Being.2 Among Heidegger’s writings, three deal directly with the problem of truth: Sein und Zeit (Being and Time,

Goal: alternative to dipstick model. (a) to avoid dubious metaphysics (b) to restore epistemology to its proper role Examples: justification of induction justification of logic (c) to allow for a better account of change in fundamental norms. Focus today mostly on (a).

Let me begin by saying how much I enjoyed Professor Michael Moore’s thick, rich, and learned book. I learned a great deal from reading it, and recommend it to anyone with an interest in any of the three topics it covers: moral responsibility, legal liability, and the metaphysics of causation. It covers such a wide breadth of terrain that even the most expert readers will learn a great deal from...