Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supp...

This paper analyzes voluntary disclosure equilibria when the voluntary disclosure model presented in WAGENHOFER (1990) is modified so as to include fixed disclosure costs as used in VERRECCHIA (1983). It turns out that incorporating both disclosure and proprietary costs rules out full disclosure equilibria. Moreover, it yields additional disclosure equilibria that differ significantly from the ...

We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this kind of equilibria. Then, we present a symbolic procedure that allows us to describe and estimate the number of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arb...

Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many real-world network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria in these games. We provide a generic centralized algorithm to compute stro...

In this paper, we describe all interior and boundary equilibria of the GrovesLedyard mechanism and test their stability. We provide closed form solutions for the equilibria discovered by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus and show that these equilibria fail to exist when the punishment parameter is high. We further show that the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is the unique stable interior equilibrium for ...