For any multilateral matching problem with dichotomous preferences, in the sense that agents are indifferent between all acceptable teams, there exist some strategy proof, individually rational and efficient mechanisms. Moreover some random matching mechanisms simultaneously satisfy the three crucial desiderata of mechanism design: efficiency, fairness and strategyproofness, which typically con...

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We examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships which involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers to end consumers. In these relationships the negotiations are inter-dependent and a bargaining externality may arise across the retailers. In addition, the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important. The manufa...

In this paper it is shown that a well known procedure (GEKS) of transitivizing a bilateral system of productivity comparisons is implicitly a way of imposing a homothetic structure onto the data. The main implication of this result is that deviations between the bilateral and the multilateral (GEKS) indexes can be interpreted as a measure of local deviation from the homothetic assumption. This ...

We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting ga...