We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from firstprice auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders’ private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedu...

In this paper, we consider a network of agents producing a positional good; an agent’s utility for the good is a function of both his intrinsic value for the good and his status, or production level relative to the production levels of his neighbors. We demonstrate that the set of Nash equilibria of our game form a complete lattice, and that natural best-reply dynamics from certain initial conf...

Game theoretic approaches to the study of electricity markets have been explored for decades [2], [7], [10]. Recently problems associated with variations of the optimal power flow problem with static (inelastic) demand for an electrical power grid [5], [21], [22], have been considered by several authors, e.g., [15], [17]. Indeed, demand elasticity for electricity is motivated by the onset of po...

We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. Via a decomposition argument, the social welfare can be maximized through separate optimizations conducted by the advertisement platform and advertisers. The framework assumes a separation of time-scales, so that on each search occurrence the platform solves an assignm...

This paper investigates bidding strategy in a package auction under incomplete information. I consider a simplified and limited case, where each bidder wants a unique bundle of goods and evaluates them as perfect complements. The auction is standard ascending with package bidding, however, I adopt the “proxy bidding rule.” The auction is interpretted as a limited version of Ausubel and Milgrom ...

Due to uncertainty and dynamic characteristics from intermittent energy load demand response (DR), the optimal operation of hybrid system is a great challenge. This article proposes an event-triggered multiagent coordinated optimization strategy with two-layered architecture. First, price-bidding-based DR model proposed different stakeholders, it also deduces bidding price Nash equilibrium theo...

This work is concerned with the application of game-theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power market. This market framework is presented as an alternative to the traditional vertically-integrated market structure, which may be better suited for develop...

the strategic pricing decisions of assembly products in assembly products supply chain are studied in this paper. firstly, a two-stage assembly products supply chain model is developed. by building nash game model, the nash equilibrium solution of pricing strategy of supplier and assemblers is obtained. next, a union decision model is built to analyze the optimal combination pricing strategy of...

Convergence bidding, a.k.a., virtual has been widely adopted in wholesale electricity markets recent years. It provides opportunities for market participants to arbitrage on the difference between day-ahead locational marginal prices and real-time prices. Given fact that convergence bids (CBs) have a significant impact operation of markets, it is important understand how strategically select th...

We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize the weighted difference of their own profit and their competitors’ profit. This assumption is motivated by inherent spitefulness, or, for example, by competitive scenarios such as in closed markets where the loss of a competitor will likely result in future gains for oneself. We der...