Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that phenomenal character of a conscious experience exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds there are also non content-based aspects features which contribute to character. Conscious attention one such feature: arguably contribution given not captured in terms what represents, properties object. Thi...

What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has property? A traditional view on matter takes to be quite intimate. Whenever property, knows does. Recently most authors have denied this view. The goal of paper defend In fact, I will something much stronger: argue what it for (consistent) must know oneself when it. As we see, theory number surprising welcome u...

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of "minimal phenomenal selfhood," which refers t...

If you, like me, always had the suspicion that there should be a straightforward (but possibly very intricate) story about how mind arises out of matter, if you always viewed perspectival problems as not forcing one to abandon physicalism, if you always felt that first person phenomenal experiences convincingly do not hint at some strange sort of unbridgeable explanatory gap, in short, if you b...

Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. In this paper, I want to explore an...

Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of ‘access-consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’. Access consciousness occurs when the content of a mental state is poised for the control of rational action, for verbal report and for use in reasoning. Phenomenal consciousness, by contrast, involves the harder-to-define presence of experiential properties, of there being ‘something it i...