One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper i...

Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about reference, knowledge, and justification from an earlier stage of the analytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts — the so-called ‘phenomenal concept strate...

The focus of the present article is on sketching a psychopathology of the body in schizophrenia and linking it to brain activity. This is done providing converging data from psychopathological evidence (phenomenal), phenomenological contructs (trans-phenomenal) and neuroscientific measures (pre-phenomenal). The phenomenal level is the detailed documentation of the patients' subjective anomalous...

Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that phenomenal character of a conscious experience exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds there are also non content-based aspects features which contribute to character. Conscious attention one such feature: arguably contribution given not captured in terms what represents, properties object. Thi...

What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has property? A traditional view on matter takes to be quite intimate. Whenever property, knows does. Recently most authors have denied this view. The goal of paper defend In fact, I will something much stronger: argue what it for (consistent) must know oneself when it. As we see, theory number surprising welcome u...