The McEliece cryptosystem is a public-key cryptosystem based on coding theory that has successfully resisted cryptanalysis for thirty years. The original version, based on Goppa codes, is able to guarantee a high level of security, and is faster than competing solutions, like RSA. Despite this, it has been rarely considered in practical applications, due to two major drawbacks: i) large size of...

We point out, in this paper, that the theory of generalized inverses of matrices over nite elds is a potential tool in cryptographic research, by proposing a public key cryptosystem. We analyse some properties of the public key cryptosystem and compare them with those of McEliece's public key cryptosystem. The idea is similar to that of McEliece's public key cryptosystem in terms of the usage o...

NTRU is a public-key cryptosystem introduced at ANTS-III. The two most used techniques in attacking the NTRU private key are meet-in-the-middle attacks and lattice-basis reduction attacks. Howgrave-Graham combined both techniques in 2007 and pointed out that the largest obstacle to attacks is the memory capacity that is required for the meet-in-the-middle phase. In the present paper an algorith...

We describe public key cryptosystems and analyse the RSA cryptosystem, pointing out a weakness (already known) of the RSA system. We define Lucas functions and derive some of their properties. Then we introduce a public key system based on Lucas functions instead of exponentiation. The computational requirements of the new system are only a little greater than those for the RSA system, and we p...

NTRUEncrypt is unusual among public-key cryptosystems in that, with standard parameters, validly generated ciphertexts can fail to decrypt. This affects the provable security properties of a cryptosystem, as it limits the ability to build a simulator in the random oracle model without knowledge of the private key. We demonstrate attacks which use decryption failures to recover the private key. ...

Several researchers have proposed the use of threshold cryptographic model to enable secure communication in ad hoc networks without the need of a trusted center. In this model, the system remains secure even in the presence of a certain threshold t of corrupted/malicious nodes. In this paper, we show how to perform necessary public key operations without node-specific certificates in ad hoc ne...

In 1991, Damgård proposed a simple public-key cryptosystem that he proved CCA1-secure under the Diffie-Hellman Knowledge assumption. Only in 2006, Gjøsteen proved its CCA1-security under a more standard but still new and strong assumption. The known CCA2-secure public-key cryptosystems are considerably more complicated. We propose a hybrid variant of Damgård’s public-key cryptosystem and show t...