Probabilistic Key pre-distribution schemes (P-KPSs) are candidates for securing interactions between resource limited computer networks. Collusion susceptible P-KPSs are trade-offs between security and complexity and security include resistance to passive eavesdropping attacks, and active message injection attacks. The existing work presented the P-KPS, the subset keys and identity tickets (SKI...

The main requirement in wireless sensor networks is not only the security but also the energy efficient security due to limited resources. In large scale deployment scenarios, there is no priory knowledge of post deployment network configuration since nodes may be randomly scattered over a hostile territory. Thus, shared keys must be distributed before deployment to provide each node some keys....

A quantum key distribution scheme whose security depends on the features of preand post-selected quantum ensembles is described. PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 42.80.Sa, 89.70.+c A wide variety of quantum key distribution schemes have been proposed, following the original Bennett and Brassard protocol [1]. Ekert [2] has described a scheme in which two parties, Alice and Bob, create a shared random key...

The Wireless sensor network communication can be captured easily, therefore there is a need for security. To achieve security in wireless sensor network, key predistribution is essential. Key pre-distribution is a method of distribution of keys onto the nodes before deployment. Key pre-distribution schemes have been developed for the better maintenance of key management in wireless sensor netwo...

We propose in this paper a new highly scalable key management scheme for WSN. We make use, for the first time, of the unital design theory for key pre-distribution in WSN. We propose a naive mapping from unitals to key pre-distribution as well as an enhanced unital-based key management scheme. We analyze our solution and compare it to basic approaches; results show that our scheme enhances cons...

Karol Horodecki, Micha l Horodecki, Pawe l Horodecki, Debbie Leung, Jonathan Oppenheim Department of Mathematics, Physics and Computer Science, University of Gdańsk, 80–952 Gdańsk, Poland Faculty of Applied Physics and Mathematics, Technical University of Gdańsk, 80–952 Gdańsk, Poland Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L1N8, Canada and Department of Ap...

We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.

Reply to Comments on " Quantum Key Distribution for d-level systems for generalized Bell states " [Phys. Rev. A, 052331, (2002)] and " Quantum secret sharing based on a reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers " [Phys. Abstract We show that the criticisms of two recent comments [1, 2] on the insecurity of quantum key distributions proposed in [3] and [4] and the secret sha...

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