We address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. Then, in a cogn...

There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example, these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The f...

This work introduces a new method for computing the incentive Stackelberg solution. Stackelberg games are models for decision making situations, where the parties, called players, act in predetermined order. The first is called the leader and the others are followers. In an incentive game the leader can commit to a decision that depends on the followers' moves. This kind of a strategy is called...

Real-World networks have an inherently dynamic structure and are often composed of communities that are constantly changing in membership. Identifying these communities is of great importance when analyzing structural properties of networks. Hence, recent years have witnessed intense research in of solving the challenging problem of detecting such evolving communities. The mainstream approach t...

In this paper, we study a kind of Stackelberg game where the controlled systems are described by backward stochastic differential delayed equations (BSDDEs). By introducing new adjoint equation, establish sufficient verification theorem for optimal strategies leader and follower in general case. Then, focus on linear–quadratic (LQ) with delay. The equilibrium is presented generalized fully coup...

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitive...

Given a prediction of opponent behavior in a generalsum two-player normal form game, it is difficult to select a strategy that balances the opportunity to use the prediction to inform one’s action with the risk of becoming predictable. We propose Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), a novel way of generating such a strategy. RSRS uses an r-safe Stackelberg equilibrium in a modifi...

The success of Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) in counterterrorism domains has inspired researchers’ interest in applying game-theoretic models to other security domains with frequent interactions between defenders and attackers, e.g., wildlife protection. Previous research optimizes defenders’ strategies by modeling this problem as a repeated Stackelberg game, capturing the special property ...

We consider a supply chain involving one supplier and one retailer in which a revenuesharing contract is adopted. Under this contract, the retailer can obtain the product from the supplier at a discounted price. As a compensation, the retailer must share his revenue with the supplier at a certain revenue-sharing rate, say r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1), where r represents the portion of the revenue to be kept b...

We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate the decision making as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. The game is formulated by restricting both players to fulfill static track constraints as well as collision constraints which depend on the combined actions of the two players. At the same time the players try to maximize their own progress. In the case wher...