We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.

Graph-restricted games, first introduced by Myerson [20], model naturally-occurring scenarios where coordination between any two agents within a coalition is only possible if there is a communication channel(a path) between them. Two fundamental solution concepts that were proposed for such a game are the Shapley value and the Myerson value. While an algorithm has been proposed to compute the S...

In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In t...

The concept of Shapley values was first introduced into the game theory by Shapley [1953] in the framework of transferable payoffs, playing an important role in the game theory. According to a standard textbook on game theory it is interpreted as in what follows. “Suppose that all the players are arranged in some order, all orders being equally likely. Then player i’s Shapley value is the expec...