The core of the 3 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) encryption standard 128-EEA3 is a stream cipher called ZUC. It was designed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and proposed for inclusion in the cellular wireless standards called “Long Term Evolution” or “4G”. The LFSR-based cipher uses a 128-bit key. In this paper, we first show timing attacks on ZUC that can recover, with about 71.43% s...

We investigate three side channel attacks on ABSG, a variant of irregularly decimated generators (IDG). The three attacks are timing analysis, phase-shift fault analysis and bit-flipping fault analysis. We also modify the attacks to non side-channel cryptanalyses, but on the assumption that the key/IV mixing is not well designed. This paper hopes to provide more understanding on actual hardware...

When designing cryptographic schemes, we usually rely on the assumption that every bit of the secret key is secret. However, in practice, loss of secrecy can happen due to side-channel attacks. For example, an adversary can get secret information using timing attacks, acoustic attacks, or even by getting access to parts of the memory used by a cryptographic protocol such as in the “cold-boot at...

We improve instruction cache data analysis techniques with a framework based on vector quantization and hidden Markov models. As a result, we are capable of carrying out efficient automated attacks using live I-cache timing data. Using this analysis technique, we run an I-cache attack on OpenSSL’s DSA implementation and recover keys using lattice methods. Previous I-cache attacks were proof-of-...

Silence suppression, an essential feature of speech communications over the Internet, saves bandwidth by disabling voice packet transmission when silence is detected. On the other hand, silence suppression enables an adversary to recover talk patterns from packet timing. In this paper, we investigate privacy leakage through the silence suppression feature. More specifically, we propose a new cl...

1 Background 2 1.1 Characterization of Anonymous Channel Based on Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1.2 Relations Proven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 A Provably Secure And Efficient Countermeasure Against Timing Attacks . . . . . . . ...

The stream cipher MUGI was proposed by Hitachi, Ltd. in 2002 and it was specified as ISO/IEC 18033-4 for keystream generation. Assuming that noise-free cache timing measurements are possible, we give the cryptanalysis of MUGI under the cache attack model. Our simulation results show that we can reduce the computation complexity of recovering all the 1216-bits internal state of MUGI to about O(2...

We present a family of block ciphers that can be implemented very e ciently on cheap Smartcard processors. The ciphers use a very small amount of RAM and a reasonable amount of ROM. Both cipher execution and key setup/key change are very fast. The ciphers resist theoretical and practical cryptanalytic attacks and in their design timing and power analysis attacks have been taken into account.

In this work we present new timing vulnerabilities that arise in the inversion of the error syndrome through the Extended Euclidean Algorithm that is part of the decryption operation of code-based Cryptosystems. We analyze three types of timing attack vulnerabilities theoretically and experimentally: The first allows recovery of the zero-element of the secret support, the second is a refinement...

Remote attackers use network reconnaissance techniques, such as port scanning, to gain information about a victim machine and then use this information to launch an attack. Current network reconnaissance techniques, that are typically below the application layer, are limited in the sense that they can only give basic information, such as what services a victim is running. Furthermore, modern re...