The general restrictions on all economic primitives (i.e., (a) endowments, (b) preferences, and (c) asset return distributions) that yield the CAPM under the expected utility paradigm are provided. These results are then used to derive the class of restrictions on preferences and the distribution of asset returns alone that provides the CAPM. We also show that the conditions that provide the CA...

We survey the literature devoted to the study of the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. We formulate a number of normative and strategic requirements on rules, and study their implications when imposed in various combinations. A unique rule emerges as being the best-behaved from a variety of viewpoints: the uniform rule. Key...

We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a Walrasian market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals choose lotteries over mechanisms, while firms supply (slots at) mechanisms at given prices. An equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. We show that...

This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-o¤ers model, a single optimization program signi…cantly reduces the computational burden. ...

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector a...

This study develops a theoretical general equilibrium model to examine optimal externality tax policy in the presence of externalities linked to one another through markets rather than technical production relationships. Analytical results reveal that the second-best externality tax rate may be greater or less than the first-best rate, depending largely on the elasticity of substitution between...

I study an economy with sellers and buyers with unit supplies and unit demands. Both parties have valuations uniformly distributed on a unit interval. I quantify the inefficiency, compared to the Walrasian market, caused by a market where the agents meet randomly. There are several causes of inefficiency that I deal with separately. First, even if there is perfect information about valuations i...

Topological effects produce chaos in multiagent simulation and distributed computation. We explain this result by developing three themes concerning complex systems in the natural and social sciences: (i) Pragmatically, a system is complex when it is represented efficiently by different models at different scales. (ii) Nontrivial topology, identifiable as we scale towards the global, induces co...