This study examined the degree to which within-individual variations in paranormal experience were related belief paranormal, preferential thinking style, and delusion formation. A sample of 956 non-clinical adults completed measures assessing experience-based indices (i.e., experience, practitioner visiting, ability), belief, science, proneness reality testing deficits, emotion-based reasoning...

In order to process the fuzzy and imprecise information in the evidential reasoning, the scholars have made many attempts to generalize belief and plausibility functions based on the Dempster-Shafer(D-S) evidence theory to fuzzy sets for many decades. A new method for defining the fuzzy closeness degree is put forward in this paper. Based on the closeness degree, another generalization of belie...

This paper presents Belief Augmented Frames, or BAFs. A BAF represents a concept or item in the world, and slotvalue pairs represent relations between BAFs. Each BAF is assigned two belief masses. The Supporting Mass represents the degree in which the evidence supports the existence of the concept or object represented by the BAF. The Refuting Mass represents the degree in which the evidence re...

We report the results of a simulation experiment inspired by a popular board game. Nine agents are wandering, searching for clues to fill the three slots of a detective case. They have a limited perceptive capacity so that they can discern a clue badly. On meeting each others, agents exchange their current results. They can be insincere, i.e., they can provide false information to divert the ot...

We suggest and test an integrated framework explaining how the interpretation of and the reasoning from causal conditionals (e.g., "If you fertilize a flower it will bloom") depend on exceptions. In the model availability of exceptional situations (e.g., "the flower was not watered enough") reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent, P(q p). The condit...

When we know the subjective probabilities (degrees of belief) p1 and p2 of two statements S1 and S2 , and we have no information about the relationship between these statements, then the probability of S1 & S2 can take any value from the interval max(p1 + p2 ? 1; 0); min(p1; p2)]. If we must select a single number from this interval, the natural idea is to take its midpoint. The corresponding \...

We design a novel model-based approach for reasoning, considering the reasoning process as the computation of the degree of belief of an intelligent agent. We assume a Knowledge Base (KB) expressed by a two Conjunctive Form (2-CF) Σ. We represent Σ using an appropriate logical structure. Our representation of a 2-CF is highly expressive since it supports efficient reasoning, even in the cases w...

An argument is categorical if its premises and conclusion are of the form All members ofC have property F, where C is a natural category like FALCON or BIRD, and P remains the same across premises and conclusion. An example is Grizzly bears love onions. Therefore, all bears love onions. Such an argument is psychologically strong to the extent that belief in its premises engenders belief in its ...

When we know the subjective probabilities (degrees of belief) p1 and p2 of two statements S1 and S2 , and we have no information about the relationship between these statements, then the probability of S1 & S2 can take any value from the interval max(p1 + p2 ? 1; 0); min(p1; p2)]. If we must select a single number from this interval, the natural idea is to take its midpoint. The corresponding \...