We design the revenue-maximizing auction for two goods when each buyer has bi-dimensional private information and a superadditive utility function (i.e., a synergy is generated if a buyer wins both goods). In this setting the seller is likely to allocate the goods inefficiently with respect to an environment with no synergies [see Armstrong, RES (2000)]. In particular, if the synergy is large t...

We study valuing the data of a owner/seller for seeker/buyer. Data valuation is often carried out specific task assuming particular utility metric, such as test accuracy on validation set, that may not exist in practice. In this work, we focus task-agnostic without any requirements. The buyer has access to limited amount (which could be publicly available) and seeks more samples from seller. fo...

Large retailers or distributors may exercise buyer power in their interactions with manufacturers in order to obtain preferential terms of sale. This paper explores the use of exclusive dealing arrangements by a monopoly retailer to win advantageous pricing from competing manufacturers of a differentiated product. When consumers’ brand preferences are weak and/or when one brand is preferred by ...

Proof. (i) In a short-term contract, prices must be subgame perfect. Thus, it is easy to see that in the second period the buyer will o¤er the lowest prices that satisfy the participation constraints of the suppliers, i.e., p22 = 2 (c1) + d (d1) for supplier 2 and p s 12 = d1 + 2 (c1) for supplier 1 (since d1 is known at the end of the …rst period). Recalling that the buyer must also incur a pe...

Despite the inherent risk arising from separating buyers and sellers, networked online marketplaces are proliferating. We describe how online auction marketplaces take advantage of institutional structures to build buyer trust in auction sellers, mitigate risk, increase satisfaction, and promote transaction intentions. It is hypothesized, based on institutional trust (Zucker 1986), that buyer t...

I illustrate the surprising strategic effects a lack of common knowledge can have in a simple example. I analyze a two-person bargaining game in which the seller makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. The seller knows everything except possibly what information the buyer has. If it is common knowledge that the buyer knows the value of the object or if it is common knowledge that the buyer do...

T paper studies a buyer’s procurement strategies in a two-stage supply chain with price-sensitive demand. The buyer procures a product from a supplier and then sells to the marketplace. Market demand is stochastic and depends on the buyer’s selling price. The supplier’s production cost is private information, and the buyer only knows the distribution of the cost. Both the buyer and the supplier...

This paper studies a buyer’s procurement strategies in a two-stage supply chain with price-sensitive demand. The buyer procures a product from a supplier and then sells to the marketplace. Market demand is stochastic and depends on the buyer’s selling price. The supplier’s production cost is private information, and the buyer only knows the distribution of the cost. Both the buyer and the suppl...

This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and incomplete information, private and common knowledge of the sellers, on seller competition. It turns out that small changes in search costs may have large but quantifiable effects on pricing when the seller has good private knowledge about the buyer, but the common knowledge of the buyer valuations is lacking among the sellers. As an app...

We develop a simple theoretical model of a long term buyer-supplier relationship with non-contractible buyer specific R&D investment, and derive predictions on the effects of trust and competition on suppliers’ investment and buyers’ procurement strategies. We address these issues empirically using unique survey data on individual buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry. ...