نتایج جستجو برای: c70
تعداد نتایج: 752 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Cl...
The solubility of pristine fullerenes can be enhanced by mixing C60 and C70 due to the associated increase in configurational entropy. This "entropic dissolution" allows the preparation of field-effect transistors with an electron mobility of 1 cm(2) V(-1) s(-1) and polymer solar cells with a highly reproducible power-conversion efficiency of 6%, as well as a thermally stable active layer.
We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6,7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C13; C91
Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by a well-defined linear ordering. In this paper we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D70
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function. JEL Classification: C70, D11, D80
The concept of stability á la J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decisiontheoretic foundation of stability, by establishing some epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction. JEL Classification: C70, C...
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