Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis. JEL Classification: C51, C92, C72, D03

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D44, D82

I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. JEL Codes: C62, C72, C73

We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects, thus showing that while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object. JEL Classification: C72, D44.

Partially specified probabilities induce coherent risk measures of a special kind. These measures are axiomatized using the four axioms that characterize coherent risk measures and an additional one, which requires that the risk measure be additive on the set of efficient portfolios. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C61, C72, D81, D82, D83

The subjective framework for reasoning is extended to incorporate the representation of unawareness in games. Both unawareness of actions and decision makers are modeled as well as reasoning about others’ unawareness. It is shown that a small grain of uncertainty about unawareness with rational decision makers can lead to cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. JEL Classificati...

We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of ”The Tragedy of the Commons” and ”R&D Spillovers in Duopoly”. JEL: .C72, D62, H40.

We introduce a small cost of leading in the two-player action commitment game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We investigate a price competition model and find that any randomized strategy equilibria converge to the Bertrand equilibrium. JEL classification numbers: L13, C72

We consider rent-seeking contests with two players that each have private information about their own cost of effort. We consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case, focusing on existence of equilibria. JEL Classification: D72; C72

Conley and Wilkie (1993) introduced and axiomatized the Nash extension bargaining solution, defined on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex problems. In this paper we present a non-cooperative game that implements the Nash extension solution in subgame perfect equilibria in the limit as the discount rate applied between rounds of play vanishes. Journal of Economic Literature Cla...