Article history: Received 14 April 2014 Received in revised form 5 June 2015 Accepted 15 June 2015 Available online 20 June 2015 This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For thewhole sample, we demonstrate that ...

This article reports on an examination of the relationships between chief executive officer (CEO) personality, transformational and transactional leadership, and multiple strategic outcomes in a sample of 75 CEOs of Major League Baseball organizations over a 100-year period. CEO bright-side personality characteristics (core self-evaluations) were positively related to transformational leadershi...

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and...

This paper examines variations in executive compensation as a function of CEO power. We assume that a CEO’s motivation to optimize his pay is conditional upon his ability to shape decisions that favor his interests. Power is inferred form overt manifestations such as share holdings, but also from covert sources such as a CEO’s social capital. Two components of compensation are considered: base ...

CEO duality, organizational slack, and ownership types have been found to affect firm performance in China. However, existing work has largely focused on their direct relationships with firm performance. Advancing this research, we develop an integrative framework to address an important and previously underexplored question: How do CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of...

We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compen...

This article examines how chief executive officers (CEOs) influence their boards in symphony orchestra governance. Traditional governance research has studied the impact of structural factors on the CEO–board relationship, but less attention has been paid to the ways in which influence in these relationships is enacted, and to the role of the CEO in particular. Drawing on two intensive, longitu...

While top management support is critical to the success of information technologies (IT), little is known about how differences and similarities between the CEO and the CIO influence such support. Accordingly, this research examines the heterogeneity between CEO and CIO as antecedents of organizational support and its impact on competitive position in regards to IT in stable and unstable enviro...

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm’s technology, the compl...

Using an objective measure of executive facial attractiveness we find that shareholders value beauty. Specifically, more attractive executives are associated with a higher abnormal return around the announcement of their appointment as CEO. These results are strongest for insider appointments and relatedly, more attractive facial features increase the likelihood of an executive winning a tourna...