The non-dictatorial asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is characterized on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and a new axiom—moderate collective rationality. The latter is logically weaker than Roth’s (1977) strong individual rationality and logically stronger than Anbarci and Sun’s (2011) weakest collective rationality.

Many bargaining situations share the following characteristics: a central party makes an offer to a group of individuals; the proposals are restricted to treat all group members equally; and decisions of the group are reached through a voting process, with the vote binding all the members of the group. Examples include debt restructuring negotiations between a troubled company and its bondholde...

We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through collective bargaining. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium ...