Most multiagent systems (MAS) either assume cooperation on the part of the agents or assume that the agents are completely self-interested, for example, in the case of bidding and other market-based approaches. However, an interesting class of MAS is one that is fundamentally cooperative, yet open, and in which one or more of the agents may be self-interested. Once self-interested agents are al...

As self-learning pricing algorithms become popular, there are growing concerns among academics and regulators that could learn to collude tacitly on non-competitive prices thereby harm competition. I study popular reinforcement learning show they develop collusive behavior in a simulated market environment. To derive counterfactual resembles traditional tacit collusion, conduct experiments with...

The one-way function tree (OFT) scheme proposed by Balenson et. al is widely regarded as an efficient key management solution for multicast communication in large dynamic groups. Following Horng’s claim that the original OFT scheme was vulnerable to a collusion attack, Ku et. al studied the collusion attack on OFT and proposed a solution to prevent the attack. The solution, however, requires to...

The one-way function tree (OFT) scheme proposed by Balenson et. al is widely regarded as an efficient key management solution for multicast communication in large dynamic groups. Following Horng’s claim that the original OFT scheme was vulnerable to a collusion attack, Ku et. al studied the collusion attack on OFT and proposed a solution to prevent the attack. The solution, however, requires to...

We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in some cases they can extract any amount the procurer is willing to offer. We show that computing how much a coalition can gain by colluding is NP-complete in general, but that in certain interesting restricted cases, the ...

The standard mechanism design approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed, disinterested third party who designs and implements the mechanism. However, in many environments, collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties. When this is the case, the standard approach may be inadequate; it neglects potential information leakages and minimizes f...

Who will Monitor the Monitors? Informal Law Enforcement and Collusion at Champagne Brishti Guha Singapore Management University Abstract Informal monitors can sometimes substitute for formal law enforcement. Monitors hired to minimize cheating, however, are themselves vulnerable to collusion and extortion. I focus on one such informal monitor – the fair authorities at the trade fairs at Champag...

This paper investigates complementarities between corruption and collusion in procurement of large divisible contracts. A first price multiple object auction procedure is administered by an agent who has some legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt i.e. willing to ‘sell’ his decision in exchange for a bribe. Ou...