Advertising is a critical process for promoting both products and services in global trade. Internet has emerged as a powerful medium for trade and commerce. Online advertising over the internet has increased more than hundredfold since 2001. In the present work, we address problems faced by online advertisement service providers. In this paper, we propose a multi-slot and multi-site combinator...

In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NP-complete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this apparent intractability. The first method, which is guaranteed to be optimal, reduces running time by structuring the sea...

The problem of optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions consists of finding the set of bids that maximize the revenue for the sellers. Various solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distribute...

At the end of the 1990s online reverse auctions were proposed as a powerful tool to improve the performance of corporate procurement. However, as many of the promises of the e-Business world failed to materialize the issue received only little attention during the last years. Hence, it is not known what kind of role reverse auctions play and what kind of auction designs are used in practice. Fo...

The need for new procurement auction mechanisms that allow for rich bid types such as bundle bids on multiple items has been raised in many situations in industrial procurement. In addition to strategic problems, the design of these combinatorial auctions exhibits hard computational problems. For example, the winner determination typically leads to NP-hard allocation problems in combinatorial a...

In this lecture we examine two different generalizations of the Vickrey auction to a setting where there are multiple distinct items to be allocated, and the agents’ values are define over bundles rather than just individual items. Auctions that allocate multiple distinct items are commonly called “combinatorial” or “package” auctions. The properties of the Vickrey auction we would like to gene...

Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than single robots, and auctions appear to be promising means for coordinating them. In a recent paper at “Robotics: Science and Systems 2005,” we analyzed a coordination system based on sequential single-item auctions. We showed that the coordination system is simple to implement and computation and communication efficient, and that the resulting sum of ...

Combinatorial auctions have been studied analytically for several years, but only limited experimental results are available, in particular for auctions with more than 10 items. We investigate the Hierarchical Package Bidding auction (HPB), the Combinatorial Clock auction (CC), and one pseudo-dual price auction (PDP) experimentally, as all these formats were used or suggested for high-stakes sp...

We study combinatorial auctions for secondary spectrum markets, where short-term communication licenses are sold to wireless nodes. Channels can be assigned to multiple bidders according to interference constraints captured by a conflict graph. We suggest a novel approach to such combinatorial auctions using a graph parameter called inductive independence number. We achieve good approximation r...

This paper characterizes the family of truthful double-sided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sidedauctions to market design, to date no characterizationof truthful double-sided auctions was made. This pa-per characterizes truthful mechanisms for double-sidedauctions by generalizing Roberts classic result [29], toshow that truthful double-sided auctions must ”a...