In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auction, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single item and each buyer to buy a single item. In this paper, we present a double-auction mechanism that handles ...

We envision a future economy where e-markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Future e-markets should be designed to be robust to manipulation, flexible, and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. One of the most important aspects of designing an e-market is market mechanism design. A market mechanism defines the organization, information exc...

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles singleparametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multip...

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates wel...

M auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) a...

In this paper, we present a novel multi-layered framework for designing strategies for trading agents. The objective of this work is to provide a framework that will assist strategy designers with the different aspects involved in designing a strategy. At present, such strategies are typically designed in an ad-hoc and intuitive manner with little regard for discerning best practice or attainin...

Considering dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous characteristics of computing resources in grid computing systems and the flexibility and effectivity of economics methods applied to solve the problem of resource management, a double auction mechanism for resource allocation on grid computing systems is presented. Firstly, a market model of double auction is described, in which agents are utili...

During the past few years, auctions have become popular in conducting trade negotiations on the Internet. The design of new auctions and other negotiation protocols has become an important topic for both, industry and academia. Traditional auction mechanisms allow price-only negotiations for which the winner determination is a computationally simple task. However, the need for new auction mecha...

This paper first describes a few existing models for product and merchant brokering and automated negotiation in the framework of agent-based emarketplaces. Our analysis shows that only simplest types of automated negotiation protocols are currently presented online, whereas some powerful systems have been already implemented in the product and merchant brokering field. Then we give an overview...

Most of data in a multi attribute decision making (MADM) problem are unstable and changeable, and thus sensitivity analysis can effectively contribute to making proper decisions. Here, we offer a new method for sensitivity analysis of multi-attribute decision making problems so that by changing one element of decision making matrix, we can determine changes in the results of a decision making p...