We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard set game. Values for set games can be applied to this standard game and determine allocations for the cooperative game. On the other hand, notions for cooperative games, like the Shapley value, the τ−value or the core can be considered in the context of the standard set games.

The widespread of decentralized and autonomous computational systems, such as highly distributed networks, has rapidly increased the interest of computer scientists for existence and efficiency of equilib-ria solutions in presence of selfish non-cooperative users. Nevertheless, there are scenarios of practical application (i.e., social networks) in which it can be observed a certain degree of c...

Process improvement plays a significant role in reducing production costs over the life cycle of a product. We consider the role of process improvement in a decentralized assembly system in which a buyer purchases components from several first-tier suppliers. These components are assembled into a finished product, which is sold to the downstream market. The assembler faces a deterministic deman...

In evolutionary dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called "lattice reciprocity" mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the prisoner's dilemma game when the population of Darwinian replicators interact through a fixed net...

Throughput and energy efficiency in 3-way relay channels are studied in this paper. Unlike previous contributions, we consider a circular message exchange. First, an outer bound and achievable sum rate expressions for different relaying protocols are derived for 3-way relay channels. The sum capacity is characterized for certain SNR regimes. Next, leveraging the derived achievable sum rate expr...

We are conducting a series of investigations whose primary objective is to demonstrate that boundedly rational agents, operating with fairly elementary computational mechanisms, can adapt to achieve approximately optimal strategies for bargaining with other agents in complex and dynamic environments of multilateral negotiations that humans find challenging. In this paper, we present results fro...

As a special case of symmetric game in which the players share a common payoff matrix, evolutionary game provides a suitable approach to model and explore the emergence of cooperative behavior in natural and social systems. The evolutionary spatial game (ESG) further specifies the payoff for each individual by both the payoff matrix M and the spatial dependence structure of the population on a ...